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Abstract
This paper presents a type system for the calculus of Mobile Resources (MR) proposed by Godskesen et al.
The type system is able to prevent undesirable border-crossing behaviour such as Trojan horses. This is
achieved by combining the notion of group with a notion of security policy. Well-typed processes satisfy a
safety property which is preserved under reduction. An algorithm is presented which computes the minimal
security policy making a process well typed.
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1 Introduction
Mobility of software across computer networks is now a widespread phenomenon.
Examples range from Java applets moving from servers to clients to the physical
movement of a computer between wireless networks. As a result, ensuring the
security of such migration has become an important issues.
A number of process calculi based on the π-calculus have been developed to
address this and related issues. Examples include the calculus of Mobile Ambients
[2], the Seal calculus [8], the Kell calculus [7] and the calculus of mobile resources
[3].
In this setting, there already exist a number of type systems that describe infor-
mation ﬂow properties. Cardelli et al. introduced a type system for access control
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within Mobile Ambients [1]. Later, Merro and Sassone presented a type system [5]
for border-crossing within the calculus of Boxed Ambients.
In this paper we present a ﬁrst such type system for the calculus of Mobile
Resources proposed by Godskesen et al. [3]. In contrast to e.g. the original for-
mulation of Mobile Ambients, migration is objective – a process must be instructed
to migrate by some other process. Moreover, the calculus is linear : once occupied,
no process can enter a location until it becomes vacant. Finally, unlike e.g. Mobile
Ambients, the MR calculus allows migration between arbitrary locations as long as
their relative adresses (paths) are known.
Like [1] and [5], our type system is based on the notion of group. Moreover, we
introduce a notion of security policy. Because migration may occur between any
two locations, the type system needs to keep track of the nesting structure of a
process. Still, the resulting type system is in our opinion less complex type than
those of [1] and [5].
Our type system guarantees safety: Well-typed processes satisfy a speciﬁc safety
property and, thanks to a subject reduction theorem, preserve safety under reduc-
tion. Moreover (and unlike [5]) we handle type inference, in that we describe how
one many compute the minimal security policy which makes a process well typed.
2 Syntax and semantics of the MR calculus
2.1 Syntax
Our syntax is that of [3] extended with type annotations. See Table 1.
We assume countable sets of names N and co-names N . We let m,n, . . . range
over N , let m˜, n˜, . . . ⊆ N and let α range over N ∪N . δ, δ′, . . . range over arbitrary
sequences from N+, and γ, γ′, . . . range over N ∗.
In MR locations are modelled as named slots which may be empty (written
n˜ ·m) or contain processes. Slots may be named by any non-empty set of names
n˜. If the name of a slot is unique, we omit brackets.
As slots can be nested, the exact location of a slot is described by its path. The
MR calculus describes mobility by a move construct δ δ′ that moves the contents
of the slot with path δ to a slot with path δ′, provided that an empty slot with this
path exists. Slots n˜ pm can be removed by the preﬁx m.
The remaining process constructs are standard. They include preﬁxing with
synchronization actions, parallel composition and replication. Note that a synchro-
nization preﬁx may be a path, allowing communication between slots at diﬀerent
levels of nesting. Restriction makes the name n local to p. Restriction annotates
the restricted name n by an s ∈ S, a so-called security policy type, and b ∈ B, which
is a group. These will be described in section 3.
Restriction is the sole binder of MR; free names (fn(p)) and bound names (bn(p))
of a process p are deﬁned as expected. The substitution of a free name n for a free
name m in p is written p[m := n] and deﬁned as expected. We write p ≡α p
′ if p′
and p are equal up to renaming of bound names.
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λ ::= γα direction path
| δ  δ′ move resource from the slot at δ to the slot at δ′
|  n delete slot with name n
p ::= 0 nil process
| λ.p preﬁxed process
| p1 ‖ p2 parallel composition
| !p replication
| (n : s, b)p restriction
| n˜ ·m empty slot
| n˜ pm slot containing process
Table 1
The syntax of mobile resources
The set of slot names sn(p) of a process p is deﬁned as the set of names used as
names of slots in p.
2.2 Semantics
Our reduction semantics follows that of [3]; reductions correspond to communica-
tions and moves. Reductions occur within evaluation contexts.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Evaluation contexts E have the syntax
E ::= (−) | n˜ Em | (n : s, b)E | E ‖ p
E(p) means that p is inserted at the hole in (−) in E .
Deﬁnition 2.2 The relation of structural equivalence ≡ on P is the least binary
reﬂexive, symmetric and transitive relation satisfying the rules below.
(E1) p ‖ 0 ≡ p (E4) (p ‖ p′) ‖ p′′ ≡ p ‖ (p′ ‖ p′′)
(E2) p ‖ q ≡ q ‖ p (E5) !p ≡ p ‖ !p
(E3) (n : s, b)p ‖ q ≡ (n : s, b)(p ‖ q), (E6) (n : s, b)0 ≡ 0
if n /∈ fn(q) (E8) E(p) ≡ E(q), if p ≡ q.
(E7) (n : s, b)n˜ pm ≡ n˜ (n : s, b)pm , (Eα) p ≡ q, if p ≡α q
if n /∈ n˜ ∪ {m}
Path contexts denote the positions where moves and synchronizations may occur.
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Deﬁnition 2.3 The N ∗-indexed family of path contexts Cγ is deﬁned by
Cε ::= (−) Cnγ ::= n˜ Cγ ‖ pm ,
for arbitrary m and p and n˜ with n ∈ n˜.
Resource contexts single out the sources and targets of moves.
Deﬁnition 2.4 The resource contexts D are deﬁned as
Dγn ::= Cγ(n˜ (−)m), n ∈ n˜
We can now deﬁne the reduction semantics of the MR calculus.
Deﬁnition 2.5 Let −→ be the least relation on P satisfying the following rules:
(R1) γα.p ‖ Cγ(α.q) −→ p ‖ Cγ(q)
(R2) γδ1  γδ2.p ‖ Cγ
(
Dδ1(q) ‖ Dδ2(·)
)
−→ p ‖ Cγ
(
Dδ1(·) ‖ Dδ2(q)
)
(R3) m.p ‖ n˜ rm −→ p, r = · ∨ r = q
(R4) E(p) −→ E(q), if p −→ q
(R5) p′ −→ q′, if p′ ≡ p and p −→ q and q ≡ q′.
The rule (R1) describes synchronization: A process γα.p can interact along a
path γ with a process α.q. Rule (R2) describes migration. The (possibly empty)
path γ describes the path common to the source slot and the target slot. Rule (R3)
deﬁnes the semantics of slot deletion. Rules (R4) and (R5) describe the role of
evaluation contexts and structural equivalence.
3 A type system for MR
Our type system assigns information of the form A&e to a process p. Here, A
describes the potential interface of p and e the eﬀect (cf. [4]), an abstract description
of the potential moves of p.
3.1 Groups and security policies
Every slot is assigned a group name and a security policy. A security policy is a
quadruple Sec[tg,ts,tr,tm], whose components are sets of types that describe
the types of trusted guests (tg), trusted senders (ts), trusted receivers (tr) and
possible move actions (tm).
If the set tr is known to be {T1, . . . , Ti}, we write tr[T1, . . . , Ti]. A slot
whose security policy has this component allows moves to slots whose types are
in {T1, . . . , Ti}. Similarly, a slot with component ts[T1, . . . , Ti] allows moves from
slots of types {T1, . . . , Ti}, and a slot with component tg[T1, . . . , Ti] may contain
slots of types {T1, . . . , Ti}. The wildcard type is ; tr[] means that the contents
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may be moved to slots of any type, ts[] that content may be sent from slots of any
type and tg[] that slots of any type may occupy the slot.
If a security policy Σ has tr as its set of trusted receivers, we write tr ∈ Σ.
The same notation applies for ts, tg and tm.
Deﬁnition 3.1 We let B range over a ﬁnite set of group names and let Σ range
over the set of security policy types S whose syntax is
T ::= B | Σ groups and security policies
Σ ::= Sec[R S G M ] security policy
R ::= tr[] | tr[T1, . . . , Ti] trusted receivers
S ::= ts[] | ts[T1, . . . , Ti] trusted senders
G ::= tg[] | tg[T1, . . . , Ti] trusted guests
M ::= tm[ ] | tm[W1, . . . ,Wi] trusted moves
W ::= B | B   | B B basic moves
Note that in any of the components, a security policy can be speciﬁed directly
instead of providing the name of a group. Also note that we (unlike [5]) can describe
full immobility, as TR may be empty.
Example 1 Consider a slot n with security policy Sec[tr[CIA,FBI] ts[Capitol]
tg[Politicians] ,tm[Politicians  Politicians]]. Here, moves from n to CIA and
FBI are allowed (trusted receivers). Also moves from the Capitol to n are allowed
(trusted senders). Politicians are welcome to guest n, and moves from any politician
to another politician are allowed.
3.2 Eﬀects
Eﬀects describe potential migrations up to the groups involved.
Deﬁnition 3.2 The set of eﬀects E of a program are subsets of the set
{x y | x, y ∈ B} .
Deﬁnition 3.3 The set of abstracted eﬀects E∗ is {x y | x, y ∈ B ∪ S ∪ {}} .
3.3 Judgements and rules
The typing judgements used in the following are of the form Δ,Γ  p ⇒ A & e,
where A ⊆ N , e ∈ E and Δ and Γ are the security type environment and the group
environment:
Deﬁnition 3.4 The security policy type environment Δ is a mapping Δ : N → S.
The group environment Γ is a mapping Γ : N → B.
We only consider environments that are well-formed.
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(T-Nil)
Δ,Γ  0 ⇒ ∅ & ∅
(T-Sync)
Δ,Γ  p ⇒ A & e
Δ,Γ  γα.p ⇒ A & e
(T-Par)
Δ,Γ  p1 ⇒ A1 & e1 Δ,Γ  p2 ⇒ A2 & e2
Δ,Γ  p1 ‖ p2 ⇒ A1 ∪A2 & e1 ∪ e2
(T-Bang)
Δ,Γ  p ⇒ A & e
Δ,Γ !p ⇒ A & e
(T-Remove)
Δ,Γ  p ⇒ A & e
Δ,Γ   n.p ⇒ A & e
(T-Res)
Δ[n → s],Γ[n → b]  p ⇒ A & e
Δ,Γ  (n : s, b)p ⇒ A \ {n} & e
Table 2
Typing rules for standard processes
Deﬁnition 3.5 The well-formedness predicate for arbitrary environment pairs
(Γ,Δ) and processes p, wf(p,Δ,Γ), is deﬁned inductively by
wf(0,Δ,Γ) = true
wf(γα.p,Δ,Γ) =wf(p,Δ,Γ)
wf(δ  δ′.p,Δ,Γ)=wf(p,Δ,Γ)
wf(p1 ‖ p2,Δ,Γ)=wf(p1,Δ,Γ) ∧ wf(p2,Δ,Γ)
wf(!p,Δ,Γ) =wf(p,Δ,Γ)
wf((n : s, b)p,Δ,Γ)=wf(p,Δ[n → s],Γ[n → b])
wf(n˜ ·l ,Δ,Γ)= ∀m,n ∈ n˜ : Δ(m) = Δ(n) ∧ Γ(m) = Γ(n)
wf(n˜ pl ,Δ,Γ)=wf(n˜ ·l ,Δ,Γ) ∧ wf(p,Δ,Γ)
The typing rules are found in Tables 2 and 3. The rules in 3 describe the typing
of migration and employ some auxiliary predicates that we shall now deﬁne.
In the T-Slot rule the guesthood relation Δ,Γ checks that names of slots in p
are allowed to guest the slot with name n˜.
Deﬁnition 3.6 Deﬁne the relation Δ,Γ⊆ P(N ) × S by A Δ,Γ Σ iﬀ  ∈
tg or ∀n ∈ A : Γ(n) ∈ tg ∨ Δ(n) ∈ tg, where tg ∈ Σ.
The eﬀect relation  also used in T-Slot checks that a given set of eﬀects stays
within the limits given by the security policy.
Deﬁnition 3.7 Deﬁne the relation ⊆ E∗×S by e  Σ iﬀ  ∈ tm or ∀ww′ ∈
e : w  w′ ∈ tm ∨  w′ ∈ tm ∨ w   ∈ tm, where tm ∈ Σ.
In the T-Move rule, the consistentΔ,Γ predicate checks if the paths δ and δ′ are
consistent. By this we mean that any subslot along the path actually is allowed as
a guest in its superslot according to the security policy.
Deﬁnition 3.8 Deﬁne the predicate consistentΔ,Γ(δ) on N
+ by
consistentΔ,Γ(n1 . . . nk) iﬀ
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(T-Nil-Slot)
Δ,Γ  n˜ ·m ⇒ n˜ & ∅
(T-Slot)
Δ,Γ  p ⇒ A & e
Δ,Γ  n˜ pm ⇒ A ∪ n˜ & e
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
n ∈ n˜
A Δ,Γ Δ(n)
e  Δ(n)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
(T-Move)
Δ,Γ  p ⇒ A & e
Δ,Γ  δ  δ′.p ⇒ A & e ∪ {Γ(n) Γ(n′)}
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ = γ1n,
δ′ = γ2n
′
n 	
Δ,Γ n
′
consistentΔ,Γ(δ)
consistentΔ,Γ(δ
′)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Table 3
Typing rules for MR processes
∀1 ≤ i < k : tg ∈ Δ(ni) ⇒  ∈ tg ∨ tg
′ ⊆ tg, where tg′ ∈ Δ(ni+1) and
∀1 ≤ i ≤ k : tm ∈ Δ(ni) ⇒ tm  Δ(ni−1).
Finally, the relation 	
Δ,Γ guarantees that the receiving slot allows more or just
as many guests as the sending slot and that the slots grant each other access.
Deﬁnition 3.9 The relation 	
Δ,Γ⊆ N ×N is deﬁned by m 	
Δ,Γ n if
• (Guests)  ∈ tg′ or tg ⊆ tg′, where tg ∈ Δ(m), tg′ ∈ Δ(n).
• (Sender and receiver)
(i)  ∈ tr or Γ(n) ∈ tr or Δ(n) ∈ tr, where tr ∈ Δ(m) and
(ii)  ∈ ts or Γ(m) ∈ ts or Δ(m) ∈ ts, where ts ∈ Δ(n)
• (Eﬀects) If it holds that tm  Δ(n) where tm ∈ Δ(m).
Note that the conditions on senders and receivers reﬂect the usual notions of
co/contravariance found in e.g. [6].
Deﬁnition 3.10 Let p be a process and Δ,Γ be environments such that wf(p,Δ,Γ).
We say that p is well-typed under Δ,Γ iﬀ ∃A, e : Δ,Γ  p ⇒ A & e.
3.4 Properties of the type system
The two central properties of our type system are that typability is preserved along
reductions and that well-typed processes are well-behaved.
Theorem 3.11 (Subject reduction) For any well-typed process Δ,Γ  p ⇒
A & e it holds that if p −→ p′ then Δ,Γ  p′ ⇒ A′ & e′ is also well-typed and
A′ ⊆ A and e′ ⊆ e.
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Deﬁnition 3.12 The eﬀect extraction function eﬀects(Γ, p) is deﬁned by
eﬀects(Γ,0) = ∅
eﬀects(Γ, γα.p) = eﬀects(Γ, p)
eﬀects(Γ, δ  δ′.p) = eﬀects(Γ, p) ∪ {Γ(n) Γ(n′)}
where δ = γ1n and δ′ = γ2n′
eﬀects(Γ,  n.p) = eﬀects(Γ, p)
eﬀects(Γ, p1 ‖ p2) = eﬀects(Γ, p1) ∪ eﬀects(Γ, p2)
eﬀects(Γ, !p) = eﬀects(Γ, p)
eﬀects(Γ, (n : s, b)p) = eﬀects(Γ, p)
eﬀects(Γ, n˜ ·m) = ∅
eﬀects(Γ, n˜ pm) = eﬀects(Γ, p)
We call a process safe in (Γ,Δ) if every visible subslot is allowed by the guesthood
relation (Deﬁnition 3.6) and all eﬀects are allowed by the eﬀect relation (Deﬁnition
3.7).
Let subp(n, p) denote the set of subprocesses of process p that are either slots
named by n or subprocesses under such slots.
Deﬁnition 3.13 Given security environment Δ and group environment Γ, process
p is safe if for all free slot names n in p we have that
∀n˜
⌊
p′
⌋
m
∈ subp(n, p) : sn(p′) \ bn(p′) Δ,Γ Δ(n) ∧ eﬀects(p
′)  Δ(n)
The following lemma states that the typing rules always extract the correct
information about visible slots and potential moves.
Lemma 3.14 For any process p it holds that if Δ,Γ  p ⇒ A & e then A =
sn(p) \ bn(p) and e = eﬀects(p).
Theorem 3.15 (Safety) Any well-typed process Δ,Γ  p ⇒ A & e is safe.
Corollary 3.16 If p is well-typed under Δ,Γ and p →∗ p′, then p′ is safe.
Safe processes need not be well-typed. A simple counterexample is the pro-
cess a 0 ‖ b · ‖ a  b.0 with typings Γ = {a → a′, b → b′} and Δ = {a →
Sec[tr[]ts[]tg[]tm[]], b → Sec[tr[]ts[]tg[]tm[]]}. This process is safe with re-
spect to Γ and Δ but not typable, as b does not trust any senders – in particular,
a is not trusted. Thus the move a b is not well-typed.
Example 2 Consider the processes
FireKit = Matchbox Match · ‖ Acetone ·
MakeAFire = FireKit ‖ MatchBox Acetone.0
Camp= FireSite MakeAFire
GoToLibrary =Camp ‖ Library · ‖ FireSite Library ‖ People ·
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with group environment Γ = {Matchbox → b, Match → m, Acetone → a,
FireSite → f, Library → l, People → p} and security policy environment
Δ = { MatchBox → Sec[tr[] ts[b] tg[m] tm[ ]]
Match → Sec[tr[ ] ts[ ] tg[ ] tm[ ]]
Acetone → Sec[tr[ ] ts[b] tg[m] tm[ ]]
FireSite → Sec[tr[l] ts[ ] tg[b,m, a] tm[b a]]
Library → Sec[tr[p, l] ts[p, l] tg[p] tm[]]
People → Sec[tr[ ] ts[ ] tg[ ] tm[ ]]
}
The process Camp is well-typed as ﬁre starting is an allowed activity at the ﬁresite.
This activity cannot be moved to the library, since the library does not permit
matches and acetone as guests. Thus the move FireSite  Library is not well-
typed by the side conditions of T-Move.
4 Minimal security policy environments
We now consider the problem of ﬁnding a minimal security policy environment for
a given process p, with a given group environment Γ. The idea is to construct the
minimal security policy environment Δ∗ from p that makes p typable with respect
to Δ∗ and Γ.
We make some simplifying assumptions on processes. For any process p we shall
assume that it has been alpha-converted to a form where fn(p) ∩ bn(p) = ∅ and all
bound names are distinct.
Security policies occurring in restrictions are transformed as follows:
• We replace stars  occurring in tr,ts and tg by ran(Γ), the range of Γ.
• We replace all  w with w1  w, . . . , wk  w where {w1, . . . , wk} = ran(Γ) and
w ∈ ran(Γ). All occurrences of w are replaced with ww1, . . . , wwk. Finally
  is replaced with {w  w′ | w,w′ ∈ ran(Γ)}.
The above transform can be applied to the set S. Call the resulting set S\. We
can then deﬁne an ordering on security policies in S\ as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let Σ,Σ′ ∈ S\.
Σ ⊆ Σ′ iﬀ
tr ⊆ tr′ ∧ ts ⊆ ts′ ∧ tg ⊆ tg′ ∧ tm ⊆ tm′
where tr,ts,tg,tm ∈ Σ and tr′,ts′,tg′,tm′ ∈ Σ′
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Deﬁnition 4.2 Deﬁne the order ≤ on
{
Δ | Δ : N → S\
}
by
Δ ≤ Δ′ iﬀ ∀n ∈ dom(Δ) : Δ(n) ⊆ Δ′(n).
and dom(Δ) = dom(Δ′).
Lemma 4.3 (
{
Δ | Δ : N → S\
}
,≤) is a complete lattice.
We now show how to extract a set of constaints from a process. In our presenta-
tion, 〈A | B〉 denotes a tuple consisting of sets A and B and ⊕ denotes component-
wise union of such tuples.
The algorithm presented in Table 4 extracts a pair of constraint sets 〈C1|C2〉
from a given process p under a given group environment Γ. Here C1 contains
constraints on the form D ⊆ (n, t) where D is a set of types, and n is a name
and t ∈ {tr,ts,tg,tm}. For example, a constraint D ⊆ (n,tg) states that the
set of types D is a subset of trusted guests in the security policy of n. The set
C2 contains constraints on the form (m, t) ⊆ (n, t), t ∈ {tg,tm}. As an example
(m,tm) ⊆ (n,tm) states that the trusted moves of m should also be trusted as
valid moves by n.
Deﬁne N as sn(p) and let l be the number of free names in N . Given a pair of
constraint sets 〈C1|C2〉 we can now compute a minimal security policy environment
for p by ﬁnding the ﬁxpoint of the composition of the two functions f1, f2 : P(N)
l×
P(N)l → P(N)l × P(N)l.
The function f1 ﬁnds the minimal requirements of a security policy as deﬁned
by the constraints C1:
f1(xG,xM ) = (yG,yM )
where the components of yG and yM are given by y
i
G = x
i
G ∪
⋃
(D⊆(i,tg))∈C1
D and
yiM = x
i
M ∪
⋃
(D⊆(i,tm))∈C1
D
The function f2 ﬁnds the requirements as deﬁned by the constraints C2:
f2(xG,xM ) = (yG,yM )
where yiG = x
i
G ∪
⋃
((m,tg)⊆(i,tg))∈C2
xmG and y
i
M = x
i
M ∪
⋃
((m,tm)⊆(i,tm))∈C2
xmM
The function h = f2 ◦ f1 is clearly monotone since f1 and f2 are. By Tarski’s
theorem, h has a least ﬁxpoint which we call x∗. This is also the least preﬁxpoint
under pointwise set inclusion, so x∗ is exactly a solution of the constraints in C1
and C2. x
∗ can be computed iteratively using Tarski’s theorem as ran(h) is ﬁnite
and as the set of group names is ﬁnite. The security policy environment can be
found from x∗ as
Δ = [n → Σn]n∈N
where
Σn = Sec[tr[
⋃
(D⊆(n,tr))∈C1
D] ts[
⋃
(D⊆(n,ts))∈C1
D] tg[πnπ1x
∗] tm[πnπ2x
∗]]
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function χ(p,Γ) =
case p of
0 : 〈∅ | ∅〉
γα.p : χ(p,Γ)
m1 . . . mk
n1 . . . nl.p :
〈
{{Γ(nl)} ⊆ (mk,tr),
{Γ(mk)} ⊆ (nl,ts)}
∣∣∣
{{(mk,tg) ⊆ (nl,tg), (mk,tm) ⊆ (nl,tm)}} ∪
{(mi,tg) ⊆ (mi−1,tg), (mi,tm) ⊆ (mi−1,tm)}1<i≤k ∪
{(ni,tg) ⊆ (ni−1,tg), (ni,tm) ⊆ (ni−1,tm)}1<i≤l
〉 ⊕
χ(p,Γ)
 n.p : χ(p,Γ)
p1 ‖ p2 : χ(p1,Γ)⊕ χ(p2,Γ)
!p : χ(p,Γ)
(n : s, b)(p) : 〈{π1s ⊆ (n,tr), π2s ⊆ (n,ts),
π3s ⊆ (n,tg), π4s ⊆ (n,tm)} | ∅〉 ⊕
χ(p,Γ[n → b])
n˜ · : 〈∅ | ∅〉
n˜ p : 〈{Γ(sn(P )) ⊆ (n,tg), eﬀects(p) ⊆ (n,tm)}n∈n˜ | ∅〉 ⊕
χ(p,Γ)
end
end
Table 4
χ extracts constraints from a process for a given group environment Γ.
Deﬁnition 4.4 We write (p,Γ) Δ if Δ is found as above from p and Γ.
Due to the presence of restriction, one may specify processes which do not have
a minimal security policy environment. As an example consider
(a : s, a′)(b : s, b′)(a 0 ‖ b · ‖ a b.0)
where s is Sec[tr[] ts[] tg[] tm[]]. Since the slots a and b do not trust each
another, the move operation is impossible – i.e. untypable. When this process is
processed by the algorithm in Table 4 we among other constraints get the constraints
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{{b′} ⊆ (a,tr), {a′} ⊆ (b,ts)}. The solution to this system will contain security
policies for a and b which have been enlarged so that a and b now trust each other.
The security policies have changed compared to their original security policy s. This
problem gives rise to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.5 A process p with group environment Γ is inconsistent if it contains
a subprocess (n : s, b)p′ for which Δ(n) = s, where (p,Γ) Δ.
Deﬁnition 4.6 Given (p,Γ) Δ and assume that p is not inconsistent. Then the
minimal security policy environment Δ∗ for p and Γ is deﬁned as
Δ∗ def= Δ|sn(P )\bn(P ).
Theorem 4.7 Let Δ∗ be the minimal security policy environment for the consistent
process p with respect to the group environment Γ. It holds that
(i) Δ∗,Γ  p ⇒ A & e for some A and e.
(ii) Δ′ : Δ′ < Δ∗ ∧Δ′,Γ  p ⇒ A & e for some A and e.
5 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have described a type system for the Calculus of Mobile Resources
[3]. The type system allows us to reason about border-crossing phenomena, some-
thing that is less straightforward in the setting of the MR calculus. Our type system
preserves a safety property. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst such type system
proposed for the calculus. With our notion of security policy it becomes straight-
forward to describe not just border-crossing properties but also properties such as
immobility (contrast this with e.g. [5]).
We also describe an algorithm for ﬁnding the minimal security policy for a
processes. A complexity analysis of our algorithm is a topic for further work.
One may imagine stronger type systems. In Deﬁnition 3.9 we require that the
security policy regarding guests and eﬀects for the receiving slot should be as least
as general as that of the sending slot. Consider a b P  ‖ c · ‖ d.a  c.0. Here
there is no co-action d, so the move a c never occurs. When this process is typed,
the slot c must allow the same guests and eﬀects as a. This gives a generality of
the security policy for c which is unnecessary. It would be desirable to be able to
type processes with respect to how they change conﬁgurations dynamically. This
would in turn require a completely diﬀerent type system in which issues concerning
causality would become central.
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